The Ister - Versionshistorik

Iammany den 23 januari 2010 kl. 15.29

2010-01-23T15:29:19Z

Iammany den 28 december 2009 kl. 14.35

2009-12-28T14:35:18Z

Iammany den 27 december 2009 kl. 18.17

2009-12-27T18:17:56Z

Iammany den 12 september 2009 kl. 12.30

2009-09-12T12:30:30Z

Iammany: /* Steigler om ''Da-sein'', dödens fantasm, det förflutna och tekniken */

2008-11-29T01:21:53Z

‎Steigler om ''Da-sein'', dödens fantasm, det förflutna och tekniken

Iammany: /* Steigler om dödlighet och tid */

2008-11-28T21:29:43Z

‎Steigler om dödlighet och tid

Iammany: /* Nancy om politikens grundande, ''mythos'' försvinnande och ''Dichtung'' */

2008-11-28T19:26:44Z

‎Nancy om politikens grundande, ''mythos'' försvinnande och ''Dichtung''

Iammany: /* Nancy om politikens grundande och mythos försvinnande */

2008-11-28T18:36:55Z

‎Nancy om politikens grundande och mythos försvinnande

Iammany: /* Från Heideggers Hölderlin’s Hymn ’The Ister’ = */

2008-11-27T19:54:57Z

‎Från Heideggers Hölderlin’s Hymn ’The Ister’ =

Iammany: /* Zeus sends Hermes */

2008-11-27T19:54:23Z

‎Zeus sends Hermes

@@ Rad 1: / Rad 1: @@
 [[Bild:Isterposter.jpg|right]]'''The Ister''' är en essäfilm från 2004, skriven, regisserad och producerad av David Barison och Daniel Ross. Speltiden är 189 minuter.
-Filmen är inspirerad av en föreläsning som [[Martin Heidegger]] gav 1942 om den tyska poeten Friedrich Hölderlins hymn ''Der Ister''. Barison och Ross följer Donaufloden från Donaudeltat vid Svarta havet i Rumänien till dess källa och under filmens gång diskuterar de intervjuade Heidegger, Hölderlin, filosofi, [[tid]], poesi, [[teknologi]], krig, [[myter]], [[politik]], [[nazism]] och [[Förintelsen]], bland mycket annat.
+Filmen är inspirerad av en föreläsning som [[Martin Heidegger]] gav 1942 om den tyska poeten Friedrich Hölderlins hymn ''Der Ister''. Barison och Ross följer Donaufloden från Donaudeltat vid Svarta havet i Rumänien till dess källa och under filmens gång diskuterar de intervjuade Heidegger, Hölderlin, filosofi, tid, poesi, [[teknologi]], krig, [[mytologi|myter]], [[politik]], [[nazism]] och [[Förintelsen]], bland mycket annat.
 Intervjuobjekten är de franska filosoferna [[Bernard Stiegler]], [[Jean-Luc Nancy]] och Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, och den tyska filmskaparen Hans-Jürgen Syberberg. Andra som intervjuas är en brokonstruktör (Nemanja Calic), en amatörbotanist (Tobias Maier) och en rumänsk arkeolog (Alexandru Suceveanu).

← Äldre version		Versionen från 28 december 2009 kl. 14.35
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	[[Kategori:Teknik]]		[[Kategori:Teknik]]
		+	[[Kategori:Utdrag]]

@@ Rad 3: / Rad 3: @@
 Filmen är inspirerad av en föreläsning som [[Martin Heidegger]] gav 1942 om den tyska poeten Friedrich Hölderlins hymn ''Der Ister''. Barison och Ross följer Donaufloden från Donaudeltat vid Svarta havet i Rumänien till dess källa och under filmens gång diskuterar de intervjuade Heidegger, Hölderlin, filosofi, [[tid]], poesi, [[teknologi]], krig, [[myter]], [[politik]], [[nazism]] och [[Förintelsen]], bland mycket annat.
-Intervjuobjekten är de franska filosoferna [[Bernard Stiegler]], [[Jean-Luc Nancy]] och [[Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe]], och den tyska filmskaparen [[Hans-Jürgen Syberberg]]. Andra som intervjuas är en brokonstruktör (Nemanja Calic), en amatörbotanist (Tobias Maier) och en rumänsk arkeolog (Alexandru Suceveanu).
+Intervjuobjekten är de franska filosoferna [[Bernard Stiegler]], [[Jean-Luc Nancy]] och Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, och den tyska filmskaparen Hans-Jürgen Syberberg. Andra som intervjuas är en brokonstruktör (Nemanja Calic), en amatörbotanist (Tobias Maier) och en rumänsk arkeolog (Alexandru Suceveanu).
 Filmen är uppdelad i fem kapitel plus en prolog och en epilog:

← Äldre version		Versionen från 12 september 2009 kl. 12.30
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	These prostheses being the hypomneses, for example the biblion, the book, denounced by Plato, the statues sculpted by Phidias, the house my grandfather built at the back of the garden, which still stands. All the things which surround us, no matter what, are in fact relics. They are immediately relics. Always. This is what archaeology teaches. The archaeologist exhumes this archival, funerary, thanatological dimension, of each and every fabricated object. Heidegger gave me this to think. It’s Heidegger who makes it thinkable. Yet it’s also what he pushed away. He pushed it away because it would mean placing technology in a manner almost unilaterally on the side of calculation, which happens with Heidegger, increasingly. Over time he leans more and more to that view of technology, and it’s an option that doesn’t take the existential analytic to its logical conclusion, in my view. And I have the cheek, as we say in French, to affirm that it’s because of this question, that Heidegger did not finish ''Being and Time''. This is why he finds himself, I think, contradicting himself on the question of technology. On the one hand he made evident that without technical supports the facticity of the past I have not lived couldn’t have reached me. From this point of view technics constitutes originary temporality. However he also said that the time of technics is the time of calculation, and therefore the time of the loss of originary time. Of what he calls ''Besorgen'', care. Which is the time of work. And one must never forget that Hegel, [[Karl Marx\|Marx]], Freud, all said that the time of work is also the time of death. There is no question of work in Heidegger, unfortunately. I think at this point the great questions of the relation between mortality and technicity become knotted.		These prostheses being the hypomneses, for example the biblion, the book, denounced by Plato, the statues sculpted by Phidias, the house my grandfather built at the back of the garden, which still stands. All the things which surround us, no matter what, are in fact relics. They are immediately relics. Always. This is what archaeology teaches. The archaeologist exhumes this archival, funerary, thanatological dimension, of each and every fabricated object. Heidegger gave me this to think. It’s Heidegger who makes it thinkable. Yet it’s also what he pushed away. He pushed it away because it would mean placing technology in a manner almost unilaterally on the side of calculation, which happens with Heidegger, increasingly. Over time he leans more and more to that view of technology, and it’s an option that doesn’t take the existential analytic to its logical conclusion, in my view. And I have the cheek, as we say in French, to affirm that it’s because of this question, that Heidegger did not finish ''Being and Time''. This is why he finds himself, I think, contradicting himself on the question of technology. On the one hand he made evident that without technical supports the facticity of the past I have not lived couldn’t have reached me. From this point of view technics constitutes originary temporality. However he also said that the time of technics is the time of calculation, and therefore the time of the loss of originary time. Of what he calls ''Besorgen'', care. Which is the time of work. And one must never forget that Hegel, [[Karl Marx\|Marx]], Freud, all said that the time of work is also the time of death. There is no question of work in Heidegger, unfortunately. I think at this point the great questions of the relation between mortality and technicity become knotted.
		+
		+	[[Kategori:Teknik]]

@@ Rad 137: / Rad 137: @@
 Now, for my part I hold to a different discourse, even if it’s very close to Heidegger’s. This makes me a lot of enemies, because Heideggerians generally defend Heidegger against my reading, and anti-Heideggerians accuse me of being a Heideggerian. So I am in the indeterminacy and solitude of ''Da-sein''. I am not in the Heideggerian ’They.’ There is a large Heideggerian ’They.’ I am not in the anti-Heideggerian ’They’ either, I am alone in another ’They.’ What is radically different in my reading of the question is that I say, yes of course, Heidegger is right in saying that technology permits one to calculate the indeterminate, but technology also makes it possible to undergo the experience of mortality. So technology is the condition of the experience of mortality.
-=== Steigler om ''Da-sein'', dödens fantasm, det förflutna och tekniken ===
+=== Steigler om ''Da-sein'', döden, det förflutna och tekniken ===
 In fact, to properly clear up this very difficult question -- in my view this is the most difficult question -- the question of time, we must consider the background to Being and time, and Heidegger’s relation to Husserl. This is very important. In my opinion, if one does not contextualise ''Being and Time'' in the difficult dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger, one cannot really understand the questions in play.

← Äldre version		Versionen från 28 november 2008 kl. 21.29
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	Now, for my part I hold to a different discourse, even if it’s very close to Heidegger’s. This makes me a lot of enemies, because Heideggerians generally defend Heidegger against my reading, and anti-Heideggerians accuse me of being a Heideggerian. So I am in the indeterminacy and solitude of ''Da-sein''. I am not in the Heideggerian ’They.’ There is a large Heideggerian ’They.’ I am not in the anti-Heideggerian ’They’ either, I am alone in another ’They.’ What is radically different in my reading of the question is that I say, yes of course, Heidegger is right in saying that technology permits one to calculate the indeterminate, but technology also makes it possible to undergo the experience of mortality. So technology is the condition of the experience of mortality.		Now, for my part I hold to a different discourse, even if it’s very close to Heidegger’s. This makes me a lot of enemies, because Heideggerians generally defend Heidegger against my reading, and anti-Heideggerians accuse me of being a Heideggerian. So I am in the indeterminacy and solitude of ''Da-sein''. I am not in the Heideggerian ’They.’ There is a large Heideggerian ’They.’ I am not in the anti-Heideggerian ’They’ either, I am alone in another ’They.’ What is radically different in my reading of the question is that I say, yes of course, Heidegger is right in saying that technology permits one to calculate the indeterminate, but technology also makes it possible to undergo the experience of mortality. So technology is the condition of the experience of mortality.
		+
		+	=== Steigler om ''Da-sein'', dödens fantasm, det förflutna och tekniken ===
		+	In fact, to properly clear up this very difficult question -- in my view this is the most difficult question -- the question of time, we must consider the background to Being and time, and Heidegger’s relation to Husserl. This is very important. In my opinion, if one does not contextualise ''Being and Time'' in the difficult dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger, one cannot really understand the questions in play.
		+
		+	[...]
		+
		+	One must never forget that ''Being and Time'' was published in 1927, that Heidegger had finished writing it by 1926, that it contains an inscription to Husserl for his 67th birthday, and in that same year, Edith Stein and Heidegger together publish Husserl’s lectures on time. This is key. [...] If one does not keep in mind that while Heidegger is writing ''Being and Time'', he is also preparing Husserl’s lecture on time for publication, one doesn’t really understand what is going on. It’s obvious that ''Being and Time'' is an argument with Husserl. It’s obviously an argument with Kant, with Hegel, and with other philosophical authorities, Greek and German, but above all it’s an argument with Husserl. Who is practically never named. And in this argument with Husserl, one thing is key. Heidegger proposes in his introduction that the past of ''Da-sein'' does not follow him, but has always already preceded him. And this past (he calls it the past of ''Da-sein'', that is, historiality, the ''Geschichtlichkeit'' of ''Da-sein'') this is not the past lived by ''Da-sein''. Rather, it’s the historial past, in the Hölderlinian sense, which is not at all Husserlian. Hölderlin has absolutely nothing to do with Husserl’s thought. Hölderlin cannot enter into Husserl’s philosophy. Husserl is far too rational. Hölderlin is a figure who can only enter philosophy through Heidegger. Hölderlin is the figure of the facticity of the past which I inherit. ''Da-sein'' is mortal insofar as he has inherited. This is crusial.
		+
		+	[...]
		+
		+	And this is also the link with Epimetheus. Epimetheus is the one who makes mistakes. And he reflects on these mistakes after the fact. In reflecting on them, he develops wisdom. This wisdom is the accumulation of reflections on past mistakes. What is the history of being? It’s the history of misinterpretations of the question of being. Epimetheus is a figure of accumulation, for the reason I have just stated, but also because he carries the prostheses which permit the inscription of the past. I was speaking before about Heidegger, and I said that mortality according to Heidegger is what makes my time mine such that it cannot be shared with another -- nobody can die in my place -- and such that it is totally indeterminate. This wil lead Heidegger to say that time must be thought from the perspective of the future.
		+
		+	My death always remains ’still to come.’ And hence a magnificent paradox: my death is the sole event I will never live. When my death arrives, I won’t be there to live it. Death will therefore never happen to me. It’s both what will never happen to me, and yet it’s the only thing which can really happen to me. Because, say you catch a flu, or you fall in love with the man or woman you love... then they leave, all this happens. Nothing is ever quite irremediable, so nothing ever happens conclusively, inasmuch as the only things that are conclusive are the irremediable things. Nothing is really irremediable, exept death. It’s only death which conclusively happens to you. The problem is that it won’t really happen either. So it’s nothing but a phantom. It has never been and it will never arrive. There are nothing but phantasms. I will come back to this in later questions. But phantasm is not a Heideggerian word. In my view Heidegger is incapable of thinking the phantasm. He challenged the phantasm which is the precise reason why he moved away from Prometheus, to turn towards Antigone and Oedipus.
		+
		+	I was saying before that the mortal is the one who is thrown into indeterminacy, and this indeterminacy is an indeterminacy to come. It’s the indeterminacy of his future. But this future, according to Heidegger, is also and above all a relation to the past. That is, I have no future other than via the possibilities I may inherit from a past, which is itself full of possibilities. And this past may be inherited from a myriad of possibilities, insofar as it’s not my past. It’s the past of the Greeks, it’s the past of Hölderlin, it’s the past of the French revolutionaries, of the English colonies in Australia, etc. But it’s not my past. It’s a past I have not lived. It’s a factical past, from that point of view. And this is the fundamental rupture with Husserl. Because Husserl has a conception of time as the articulation of the present, of ’retention’, and of ’protention’, which Heidegger knows extremely well since he’s in the process of writing these parts of ''Being and Time''. And he’s also in the process of publishing Husserl’s text, which he possibly knows better than Husserl himself, with a certain objectivity, a distance. And he knows perfectly well that in Husserl a past that is not lived has no meaning. For a phenomenologist like Husserl, nothing counts other than ’the lived.’ We might call this Heidegger’s romanticism, which introduces the dimension of history. Whereas, for Husserl there is nothing but the mind in its absolute intimacy. And the experience of the living present.
		+
		+	And, according to Heidegger, the present is not living. It is mortified, haunted by the phantoms of the non-lived past. But here I add, for my part, that this haunting, which is a legacy of the dead who have lived before me but who remain in my consciousness, in my spirit, in my soul, call it what you will, in my existence, if you want to speak Heidegger’s language, the dead remain, because they are still present in the world. They are still present in the world through the prostheses they have left behind.
		+
		+	These prostheses being the hypomneses, for example the biblion, the book, denounced by Plato, the statues sculpted by Phidias, the house my grandfather built at the back of the garden, which still stands. All the things which surround us, no matter what, are in fact relics. They are immediately relics. Always. This is what archaeology teaches. The archaeologist exhumes this archival, funerary, thanatological dimension, of each and every fabricated object. Heidegger gave me this to think. It’s Heidegger who makes it thinkable. Yet it’s also what he pushed away. He pushed it away because it would mean placing technology in a manner almost unilaterally on the side of calculation, which happens with Heidegger, increasingly. Over time he leans more and more to that view of technology, and it’s an option that doesn’t take the existential analytic to its logical conclusion, in my view. And I have the cheek, as we say in French, to affirm that it’s because of this question, that Heidegger did not finish ''Being and Time''. This is why he finds himself, I think, contradicting himself on the question of technology. On the one hand he made evident that without technical supports the facticity of the past I have not lived couldn’t have reached me. From this point of view technics constitutes originary temporality. However he also said that the time of technics is the time of calculation, and therefore the time of the loss of originary time. Of what he calls ''Besorgen'', care. Which is the time of work. And one must never forget that Hegel, [[Karl Marx\|Marx]], Freud, all said that the time of work is also the time of death. There is no question of work in Heidegger, unfortunately. I think at this point the great questions of the relation between mortality and technicity become knotted.

← Äldre version		Versionen från 28 november 2008 kl. 19.26
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	The world of ''tekhne'' and the world of ''Dichtung'' are in fact the same world, because they are both the world of the production of ends. It is the world of the production of the ends towards which our efforts are directed. Alternately: it is the world of the production of ’one’s own.’ In the mythological world, one’s own is a given. Whereas in the logical world, in the non-mythological world, one’s own is not a given. Rather it must be produced. For this reason, the production of one’s own is a production with an ''aporia'' of violence behind it, and ahead of it a confrontation with total or absolute foreignness. What Heidegger calls ''das Unheimliche'' or ''das Unheimische''. Voila: that’s how I see things. This means that with the West, and with philosophical technology, if you like, politico-philosophical technology, there appears an institution which is the search, the infinite demand for one’s own, which only ever presents itself through a foreignness to itself.		The world of ''tekhne'' and the world of ''Dichtung'' are in fact the same world, because they are both the world of the production of ends. It is the world of the production of the ends towards which our efforts are directed. Alternately: it is the world of the production of ’one’s own.’ In the mythological world, one’s own is a given. Whereas in the logical world, in the non-mythological world, one’s own is not a given. Rather it must be produced. For this reason, the production of one’s own is a production with an ''aporia'' of violence behind it, and ahead of it a confrontation with total or absolute foreignness. What Heidegger calls ''das Unheimliche'' or ''das Unheimische''. Voila: that’s how I see things. This means that with the West, and with philosophical technology, if you like, politico-philosophical technology, there appears an institution which is the search, the infinite demand for one’s own, which only ever presents itself through a foreignness to itself.
		+
		+	=== Steigler om dödlighet och tid ===
		+	In Heidegger’s thought mortality is determined in many ways but what Heidegger calls mortality is first of all (besides the fact that nobody else can die in my place, that my death is always in each case mine), -- Apart from that, mortality is what I cannot foresee. It’s what I know most profoundly, just as originarily as I know ontological difference, just as I know being. When I speak, I speak of being, I speak the language of being. Spontaneously, immediately. It’s a primordial and originary knowledge. This knowledge of being is primordial and originary because even if I don’t ask myself ’what is being?’ I still use the verb ’being,’ as Heidegger says. As soon as I speak, the verb ’to be’ is already there. When I say ’I walk,’ in fact I say ’I am walking.’ The verb ’to be’ is always already in all verbs. Similarly, as soon as I am living, I am dying. I know that I am dying. Alongside life, there is always already the knowledge that I am on the path towards death. It’s an absolutely originary knowledge. But it’s a knowledge like ontological difference, like the knowledge of being, which presents itself as a non-knowledge, as a forgetting. Heidegger says being presents itself in forgetting itself, in absenting itself. And he says, in the same manner, the relation I have to death is one of forgetting. I block it out. That’s not to say I don’t know it. On the contrary, the more I forget it, the more it governs and commands me. The forgetting in question here is related just as much to being as it is to death. That is, to time, since what links being and death is temporality. Death is the temporality of being, in a certain sense. Mortality is the temporality of being, insofar as mortals are the ones charged with the question of being, as the question of the meaning of being. And for mortals, this question presents itself as the question of one’s mortality. That is to say, of one’s indeterminacy.
		+
		+	[...]
		+
		+	Now, there are many other aspects one should submit as evidence, to understand what Heidegger means by the mortality of ''Da-sein''. ''Da-sein'' is the one who, being mortal, seeks always to postpone his own death. In the attempt to defer death, he differentiates himself. He ’subjectivizes’ himself from other people. (This is not Heidegger’s vocabulary.) Let’s say he individuates himself. This means that he singularizes himself through what is his own, insofar as he is an individual who is not another individual.
		+
		+	[...]
		+
		+	This is the structure of being-towards-death, keeping in mind one never knows when it will arrive. And so the life of ''Da-sein'' is hit right away with a principle of indetermination. And so ''Da-sein'' has a tendency to flee its destiny, as Heidegger says. He will seek to determine, to calculate, and hence to flee his own death, his unique destiny, by diving into and joining ''das Man'', the ’They,’ common time, and also the time of intra-temporality, inauthentic time. Technical time. Which means the time of the clock, the time of the calendar, the time of the media, of television, of radio, etc. Now, I have brutally, schematically summarised Heidegger’s discourse on the relation between death, time, and the ’They.’ And calculation, and thus technology, because the time of the ’They,’ the time of media, and the time of the calendar are the time of technology, of calculation. Now, the calculation which seeks to calculate the incalculable, the indeterminate, seeks to flee originary time. Therefore, in a sense, it’s the time of non-time, the time of the elimination of time, the time of metaphysics.
		+
		+	Now, for my part I hold to a different discourse, even if it’s very close to Heidegger’s. This makes me a lot of enemies, because Heideggerians generally defend Heidegger against my reading, and anti-Heideggerians accuse me of being a Heideggerian. So I am in the indeterminacy and solitude of ''Da-sein''. I am not in the Heideggerian ’They.’ There is a large Heideggerian ’They.’ I am not in the anti-Heideggerian ’They’ either, I am alone in another ’They.’ What is radically different in my reading of the question is that I say, yes of course, Heidegger is right in saying that technology permits one to calculate the indeterminate, but technology also makes it possible to undergo the experience of mortality. So technology is the condition of the experience of mortality.

@@ Rad 101: / Rad 101: @@
 For this very reason the polis remains what is properly worthy of question, that which, on account of such worthiness, prevails in permeating all essential activity and every stance adopted by human beings.
-=== Nancy om politikens grundande och mythos försvinnande ===
+=== Nancy om politikens grundande, ''mythos'' försvinnande och ''Dichtung'' ===
 First I want to say something quite removed from Heidegger, and later perhaps I’ll come back to him. Because it’s very important, if we properly pose the question of foundation, of commencement, not only historically, but if we pose it as a question of foundation as such, of institution as such, it’s important to consider how these questions have an origin and a beginning themselves. That is, the beginning of the West is also the beginning of a question of institution, or of foundation. These questions have appeared ...several times in the history of the West. At least three times. The first time is the foundation of the city as democracy. The second is the foundation of absolute monarchy. And the third is the foundation of modern democracy, the social contract. In these three cases there is a problem, a question of foundation or institution. It’s not something self-evident. Now this question of foundation arises as a question at the moment when foundations have vanished. That is, when foundations which were clear, as in most empires... And I mean empires prior to the West, Egyptian, Assyrian, Assyrio-Babylonian, and prior to them the Hittite empire. These empires have clearly given foundations. They always have their foundations behind them. They are founded by the gods. They have always been there, and their order is established for all time. An empire’s foundation is thus superimposed upon the whole empire.
@@ Rad 108: / Rad 108: @@
 The beginning of the West is the beginning of the vanishing of these foundations. And it’s a foundation which appears explicitly as auto-foundation. Democracy says, ’Voila, I found myself, I appear. I appear as a rising up of the people, free men, against tyranny.’ Democracy always appears against tyranny. Obviously Greek democracy presents itself as auto-foundation. It has no myths behind it. It says: ’I myself perform the act of founding.’ There is no going back to myth or the sacred. Rather, one looks back to the great lawgiver ancestors, the founders of the law. That is, back to Dracon, Solon, to a human institution of law. Simultaneously this auto-foundation indicates the impossibility of fixing the origin. One asks: what did the first lawgiver have behind him? And who instituted the first lawgiver? So, on the one hand, you have a kind of regress ad infinitum. On the other hand there is, obviously, an immediate relation to violence. And with ’the other.’ Because there is a violent other, the tyrant. We have to topple the tyrant. The West begins with the long line of people who commit tyrannicide: the tyrannicide-hero. And, at the same time, the tyrannicide is also itself violence. A legitimate violence, an act of violence where we might find the first auto-legitimation. ’I’m legitimate because I killed the tyrant.’ But I must already have devided that the tyrant is not legitimate.
-So this knot of questions corresponds to what? I think it corresponds to the vanishing of [[mytologi|mythology]] as foundation. What makes mythologies vanish? In what context do they disappear? They disappear in the same context in which human sacrifice disappears. That is, roughly between the 12th and 8th centuries BC. I believe this disappearance occurs at the same time as the appearance of a certain number of techniques: the techniques of alphabetic writing and all the techniques linked to commerce. Because writing itself begins with commerce, with the cuneiform writing of the Assyrians, which is initially a form of commercial bookkeeping. With commerce arrive techniques of economics, calculation and trade, accompanied by techniques of navigation, of transport on land and on the sea. And at a certain moment in this world of intense technical transformation, in the 9th or 8th century BC, there also emerges the ’sophistic’ techniques. This sophistic technique is a technique of logos, and thus of the word. But ’word’ in a specific sense: as discourse, as argument, as a means of power and persuasion.
+So this knot of questions corresponds to what? I think it corresponds to the vanishing of [[mytologi|mythology]] as foundation. What makes mythologies vanish? In what context do they disappear? They disappear in the same context in which human sacrifice disappears. That is, roughly between the 12th and 8th centuries BC. I believe this disappearance occurs at the same time as the appearance of a certain number of techniques: the techniques of alphabetic writing and all the techniques linked to commerce. Because writing itself begins with commerce, with the cuneiform writing of the Assyrians, which is initially a form of commercial bookkeeping. With commerce arrive techniques of economics, calculation and trade, accompanied by techniques of navigation, of transport on land and on the sea. And at a certain moment in this world of intense technical transformation, in the 9th or 8th century BC, there also emerges the ’sophistic’ techniques. This sophistic technique is a technique of ''logos'', and thus of the word. But ’word’ in a specific sense: as discourse, as argument, as a means of power and persuasion.
 The word becomes the object of a technique, or of a ’technology’, as in English. And then philosophy emerges from sophistic technology. Philosophy then immediately presents itself as the good sophism, which has in view the good foundation of the good city, etc.
-What’s important in all this is the question: What is proper to these techniques? Sophistic, philosophical, and political techniques (in the sense of the polis)? What is proper to them is that these techniques do not replace one given with another. It’s not a matter of replacing one mythology with another. It consists precisely in substituting mythos with logos.
+What’s important in all this is the question: What is proper to these techniques? Sophistic, philosophical, and political techniques (in the sense of the polis)? What is proper to them is that these techniques do not replace one given with another. It’s not a matter of replacing one mythology with another. It consists precisely in substituting ''mythos'' with ''logos''. Now, if one has ''logos'' in the place of ''mythos'', this does not mean you have a new ''mythos'', but a withdrawal, a disappearance of ''mythos'', and a promotion of ''[[teknik|tekhne]]''. What does ''tekhne'' mean? ''Tekhne'' means knowledge, know-how, as Heidegger often says. Knowing how to obtain from ''physis'', nature, what it does not offer of itself. In the world of ''mythos'', there is no separation between ''physis'' and ''tekhne''. In the world of ''logos'', ''physis'' and ''tekhne'' are separated. And ''tekhne'', essentially, is that which has no end. It’s know-how directed at a goal, but that goal is not given. It must be produced.

@@ Rad 92: / Rad 92: @@
 What does it mean, that man is mortal? It means he is condemned to anticipate his own death. His own end. Man is always restless, in perpetual anxiety about his end. What [[Martin Heidegger|Heidegger]] calls [[Ångest|Angst]]. Anxiety about death. [...] The myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus tells the story of this fundamental anxiety, of a being who is fundamentally mortal. A being for whom there is no way of escaping death. But who, on the other hand, is in charge of his own destiny: Geschick. This means that the myth retells in a pre-metaphysical version, before Plato’s metaphysics, the articulation between Geschick (destiny), time, and technics. Because the question is indissociably that of memory, of forgetting: ’I forgot!’ (Epimetheus). This problematisation of technics as memory, as time, as forgetting and as destiny, is opened up by Protagoras who draws on Aeschylus and Hesiod. And this opens up the question of the political.
-== Från Heideggers Hölderlin’s Hymn ’The Ister’ ===
+=== Från Heideggers Hölderlin’s Hymn ’The Ister’ ===
 To the polis there belong the gods and the temples, the festivals and games, the governors and council of elders, the people’s assembly and the armed forces, the ships and the field marshals, the poets and the thinkers.

← Äldre version		Versionen från 27 november 2008 kl. 19.54
Rad 80:		Rad 80:

	:”Moreover you must lay it down as my law, that if anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of respect and justice, he shall be put to death as a plague to the city.”		:”Moreover you must lay it down as my law, that if anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of respect and justice, he shall be put to death as a plague to the city.”
		+
		+	=== Steigler om minne och rättvisa ===
		+	...Zeus is forced to send Hermes. Because men want to make war against each other. They ask themselves questions [and] they don’t agree on the answers. So they massacre one another. Thus the famous civil war which inspires so much fear in the Greeks. What the Greeks called stasis. And it’s an historical fact. At the time when Plato retells the myth, through the mouth of Protagoras, the Greeks are in the middle of the Peloponnesian war; the war between all Greeks. I was saying earlier that man is a being who adopts: new technics, new names, new ideas, new art works, without end. Adoption is war. The possibility of adoption is the risk of war. Without end. Protagoras recounts that Zeus will send Hermes, the knowledge of dike, justice, to prevent men from annihilating one another.
		+
		+	[...]
		+
		+	But for dike to become necessary there must first be technics. Technics, the prosthesis, the artifice, which permits men to survive against their predators, as the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus recounts. But technics is also the support of memory: books. Books are a support of memory, a prosthesis, which will also allow Hermes to write the law.
		+
		+	In the ancient Greek world, Prometheus and Epimetheus are gods who belong to the tragic epoch of Greece, when the Greeks didn’t believe in the immortal soul. In the tragic epoch of Greece there in no immortal soul. There is a conception of the soul which as a spirit wanders in the realm of the dead. But it is not immortal. This is important. It means that the thought of Prometheus and Epimetheus is a pre-Christian thought, prior to Christianity and prior to Platonism. It’s Plato who introduces the idea of the immortality of the soul, preparing for the later appropriation of Greek thought be [[Paulus\|Saint Paul]]. Before Plato no-one in Greece thought the soul was immortal. It was thought the soul, or man, or consciousness, or the ego, but let’s say the mortal, was exactly that: mortal.
		+
		+	What does it mean, that man is mortal? It means he is condemned to anticipate his own death. His own end. Man is always restless, in perpetual anxiety about his end. What [[Martin Heidegger\|Heidegger]] calls [[Ångest\|Angst]]. Anxiety about death. [...] The myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus tells the story of this fundamental anxiety, of a being who is fundamentally mortal. A being for whom there is no way of escaping death. But who, on the other hand, is in charge of his own destiny: Geschick. This means that the myth retells in a pre-metaphysical version, before Plato’s metaphysics, the articulation between Geschick (destiny), time, and technics. Because the question is indissociably that of memory, of forgetting: ’I forgot!’ (Epimetheus). This problematisation of technics as memory, as time, as forgetting and as destiny, is opened up by Protagoras who draws on Aeschylus and Hesiod. And this opens up the question of the political.
		+
		+	== Från Heideggers Hölderlin’s Hymn ’The Ister’ ===
		+	To the polis there belong the gods and the temples, the festivals and games, the governors and council of elders, the people’s assembly and the armed forces, the ships and the field marshals, the poets and the thinkers.
		+
		+	Yet we are never to think all these according to the civil state of the nineteenth century. None of these are merely pieces of embellishment for some state ordinance that puts value on producing ”cultural achievements.”
		+
		+	Rather, from out of the relation to the gods, out of the kind of festivals and the possibility of celebration, out of the relationship between master and slave, out of a relation to sacrifice and battle, out of a relationship to honor and glory, out of the relationship between these relationships and from out of the grounds of their unity, there prevails what is called the polis.
		+
		+	For this very reason the polis remains what is properly worthy of question, that which, on account of such worthiness, prevails in permeating all essential activity and every stance adopted by human beings.
		+
		+	=== Nancy om politikens grundande och mythos försvinnande ===
		+	First I want to say something quite removed from Heidegger, and later perhaps I’ll come back to him. Because it’s very important, if we properly pose the question of foundation, of commencement, not only historically, but if we pose it as a question of foundation as such, of institution as such, it’s important to consider how these questions have an origin and a beginning themselves. That is, the beginning of the West is also the beginning of a question of institution, or of foundation. These questions have appeared ...several times in the history of the West. At least three times. The first time is the foundation of the city as democracy. The second is the foundation of absolute monarchy. And the third is the foundation of modern democracy, the social contract. In these three cases there is a problem, a question of foundation or institution. It’s not something self-evident. Now this question of foundation arises as a question at the moment when foundations have vanished. That is, when foundations which were clear, as in most empires... And I mean empires prior to the West, Egyptian, Assyrian, Assyrio-Babylonian, and prior to them the Hittite empire. These empires have clearly given foundations. They always have their foundations behind them. They are founded by the gods. They have always been there, and their order is established for all time. An empire’s foundation is thus superimposed upon the whole empire.
		+
		+	[...]
		+
		+	The beginning of the West is the beginning of the vanishing of these foundations. And it’s a foundation which appears explicitly as auto-foundation. Democracy says, ’Voila, I found myself, I appear. I appear as a rising up of the people, free men, against tyranny.’ Democracy always appears against tyranny. Obviously Greek democracy presents itself as auto-foundation. It has no myths behind it. It says: ’I myself perform the act of founding.’ There is no going back to myth or the sacred. Rather, one looks back to the great lawgiver ancestors, the founders of the law. That is, back to Dracon, Solon, to a human institution of law. Simultaneously this auto-foundation indicates the impossibility of fixing the origin. One asks: what did the first lawgiver have behind him? And who instituted the first lawgiver? So, on the one hand, you have a kind of regress ad infinitum. On the other hand there is, obviously, an immediate relation to violence. And with ’the other.’ Because there is a violent other, the tyrant. We have to topple the tyrant. The West begins with the long line of people who commit tyrannicide: the tyrannicide-hero. And, at the same time, the tyrannicide is also itself violence. A legitimate violence, an act of violence where we might find the first auto-legitimation. ’I’m legitimate because I killed the tyrant.’ But I must already have devided that the tyrant is not legitimate.
		+
		+	So this knot of questions corresponds to what? I think it corresponds to the vanishing of [[mytologi\|mythology]] as foundation. What makes mythologies vanish? In what context do they disappear? They disappear in the same context in which human sacrifice disappears. That is, roughly between the 12th and 8th centuries BC. I believe this disappearance occurs at the same time as the appearance of a certain number of techniques: the techniques of alphabetic writing and all the techniques linked to commerce. Because writing itself begins with commerce, with the cuneiform writing of the Assyrians, which is initially a form of commercial bookkeeping. With commerce arrive techniques of economics, calculation and trade, accompanied by techniques of navigation, of transport on land and on the sea. And at a certain moment in this world of intense technical transformation, in the 9th or 8th century BC, there also emerges the ’sophistic’ techniques. This sophistic technique is a technique of logos, and thus of the word. But ’word’ in a specific sense: as discourse, as argument, as a means of power and persuasion.
		+
		+	The word becomes the object of a technique, or of a ’technology’, as in English. And then philosophy emerges from sophistic technology. Philosophy then immediately presents itself as the good sophism, which has in view the good foundation of the good city, etc.
		+
		+	What’s important in all this is the question: What is proper to these techniques? Sophistic, philosophical, and political techniques (in the sense of the polis)? What is proper to them is that these techniques do not replace one given with another. It’s not a matter of replacing one mythology with another. It consists precisely in substituting mythos with logos.